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IN THE UTAH COURT OF 
APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
JOSEPH P. POWANSNIK 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Appellate Court No. 94024-CA 
Priority #2 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over final orders 
entered by the District Court pursuant Utah code Annotated (1953 as 
amended), § 78-2a-3 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
WHETHER A PROVISION UNDER UTAH CODE § 58-37-8(5) (b) WHICH 
PROVIDES FOR A GREATER PENALTY FOR CONVICTION OF A CRIME 
AS IDENTIFIED UNDER UTAH LEGISLATION, IF THE ACT IS 
COMMITTED WITHIN 1000 FEET OF A PUBLIC PARK IS A SEPARATE 
OFFENSE, THUS REQUIRING PROOF DURING TRIAL, OR IS A 
SENTENCE ENHANCEMENT? 
II. WHETHER THE JUDGE EXCEEDED HIS SCOPE WHEN 
ADMITTING INTO EVIDENCE BY JUDICIAL NOTICE THE 
POLICE MEASUREMENT OF THE RESIDENCE BEING 
WITHIN 1000 FEET OF A PUBLIC PARK? 
III. ASSUMING JUDICIAL NOTICE OF THE POLICE 
MEASUREMENT IS IMPERMISSIBLE, WHETHER THE 
PROSECUTION ESTABLISHED THE PROPER FOUNDATION 
FOR ADMISSION OF THE FINDING THAT THE 
RESIDENCE WAS WITHIN 1000 FEET OF A PARK? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
ISSUES I, II, & III 
The Utah Court of Appeals should treat the trial court's 
conclusion and the admissibility of evidence as a question of law. 
State v. Mickelson, 848 P. 2d 677 (Ut. Ct. App. 1992); State v. 
Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 781 (Utah 1991). The court shall "review 
such questions for correctness, according no particular deference 
to the trial court. State v. V.G.P. . 845 P. 2d 944 (Ut. Ct. App. 
1992); Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 752 P.2d 
884, 887 (Utah 1988) . In addition, the Court, in reviewing the 
trial court's conclusions of law, shall apply "a correction of 
error standard with no deference to the trial court." Hansen v. 
Dept. Of Fin. Insts. , 858 P.2d 184, 185-86 (Ut. Ct. App. 1993); 
Marchant v. Park City, 771 P.2d 677, 680 (Ut. Ct. App. 1989) . Also, 
statutory construction presents a question of law, which the court 
reviews for correctness. Scudder v. Kennecott, Inc. 858 P.2d 1005, 
1009 (Ut. Ct. App. 1993); Berube v. Fashion Centre Ltd., 771 P.2d 
1033, 1038 (Utah 1989). 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Defendant, Joseph P. Powasnik, at the residence of one, 
DeAnne Cain, a girlfriend, was alleged to have been, in conjunction 
with DeAnne Cain, using the location at 207 South 200 East, Logan, 
Utah, for the distribution of methamphetamine. Using police a UHF 
Frequency Scanner law enforcement officers monitored telephone 
conversations from Third party(s) to DeAnne Cain's residence. 
Based on the information received therein, search warrants and 
warrants for arrest were issued and various individuals were 
arrested including DeAnne Cain and Joseph P. Powasnik. DeAnne Cain 
and at least one other Defendant entered a guilty pleas to reduced 
charges, pursuant to plea negotiations which included in part, the 
promise to give testimony against the Defendant herein, Joseph P. 
Powasnik. The search warrant revealed the evidence of materials 
that was alleged to be drug paraphanalia as well as substance that 
was, according to testimony, a lab at Weber State College to be the 
controlled substance of methamphetamine. Subsequent to the arrest 
the Defendant was incarcerated and based on alleged probation 
violation remained incarcerated until the time of the trial and 
final sentencing. 
a. NATURE OF THE CASE 
The alleged distribution of a controlled substance to wit: 
methamphetamine was charged as a second degree felony and enhanced 
to a first degree felony as a result of the allegations that the 
3 
alleged sale or distribution took place within a thousand feet of 
a park. It is the enhancement of the charge which is the subject of 
this appeal. 
b. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant, after multiple arraignments and scheduling of 
preliminary hearing was granted a conflict of interest public 
defender to represent him in preliminary hearing and subsequently 
bound over to the First District Court for proceedings before the 
Honorable Judge Gordon Low. 
C. DISPOSITION OF TRIAL COURT 
1. Trial Court through Judge Gordon Low advised the 
respective attorneys for Plaintiff and Defendant that he was 
treating the enhancement to be a sentencing matter and that 
evidence regarding enhancement would be heard after the trial and 
out of the hearing of the Jury. Thereafter, pursuant to a Jury 
trial, the matter was heard on the 20th day of December, 1994, at 
which time, despite disputes in testimony, the Jury verdict of 
guilty was entered to a second degree felony of drug distribution 
(methamphetamine). 
The enhancement hearing was conducted on the 3rd day of 
January, 1995, at which time the judge made a finding that there 
was sufficient evidence, that the distribution of methamphetamine, 
which was the verdict from the prior Jury trial, occurred with in 
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a thousand feet of a park and was therefore to be enhanced under 
Utah Code. Having thus made the finding the matter was scheduled 
for sentencing and Defendant was, thereafter, sentenced to a term 
of not less than five years to life with a probation violation 
being established and the original sentence that the state entered 
and advised for the recommendation to the Board of Pardons that the 
sentences run concurrently. Subsequently, the matter was appealed 
by the Defendant. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Despite the disputed testimony regarding the ownership of the 
drugs and drug paraphernalia located at the residence of DeAnne 
Cain and the party or parties to whom any drug transactions may 
have taken place the Jury did, in fact, find the Defendant guilty 
of the second degree crime of distribution of a control substance 
to wit methamphetamine. 
At the time of the enhancement hearing the state called its 
witnesses, officer Tim Scott, who's testified that he had been 
present at the time of the measurement of the distance of the 
residence of DeAnne Cain to the park in question and the officer 
conducting the measurement used a pedometer. Testimony is 
disclosed by the transcript disclosed that while he was present he 
did not do the actual measurement, did not select the 
instrumentality to be used for measurements and only had his 
attention drawn to the reading on the pedometer. Counsel for the 
Defendant objected to the in conclusion of this testimony on the 
basis that it lacked foundation both as to the inclusion of the 
reading by virtue of having not been a party to which had actually 
conducted the measuring, and in addition, on the basis that he 
could not testify that the instrumentality used for the measurement 
have been calibrated, was in working order or to how it was 
selected for use or any of its history. 
Notwithstanding the objection, the Judge hearing the matter 
accepted the evidence and as an additional factor found that, 
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because of his own personal knowledge of that locality (having 
passed papers as a young boy), took judicial notice that the blocks 
in that area were approximately 800 feet and that therefore the 
Cain residence was in fact within a 1,000 feet of the park. 
The court erred in treating the enhancement as a mere 
sentencing enhancement and not an element of the crime, and in 
allowing the inclusion of the evidence from the pedometer for the 
measurement of the 1,000 feet for the enhancement, and for taking 
judicial notice of facts that were his own personal knowledge but 
not within the general knowledge of an ordinary reasonable member 
of society. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Defendant-Appellant alleges that the following is a summary of 
the arguments which show that the courts order of enhancement, 
should be set aside, and the case be remanded for sentencing in 
accordance with a conviction for a second degree felony. 
The law does not support the trial courts holding in the 
above-entitled action to allow for the conviction of nor 
enhancement to a First Degree Felony. 
The 1000 feet within a park is or should be a separately 
proven element of the crime charged as a First Degree Felony. This 
means the measurement of the 1000 feet should be subject to 
appropriate and discernable safeguard as to its use, which would be 
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the basis for the foundation necessary for its proper inclusion as 
credible evidence. Further, the judge should not include those 
items within his own personal knowledge as an evidentiary basis for 
a decision unless it is clearly within the common knowledge of the 
ordinary and reasonable member of society. 
POINTS, AUTHORITIES, AND ARGUMENT 
I. 
UTAH CODE SECTION 58-37-8 (5) (b) WHICH PROVIDES FOR A 
GREATER PENALTY FOR CONVICTION OF A CRIME INVOLVING 
POSSESSION AND/OR DISTRIBUTION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE 
CONSTITUTES AN "OFFENSE" WHICH HAS AN ELEMENT OF PROOF 
THAT THE ACT COMMITTED TOOK PLACE WITHIN 1000 FEET OF A 
PUBLIC PARK. 
A person who is convicted under subsection 5(a) of Utah Code 
Ann. § 58-37-8 is subject to a greater penalty for the commission 
of any unlawful act involving controlled substances or drug 
paraphernalia if the act is committed within 1,000 feet of any 
schools and other specified structures, facilities, or grounds, 
including public parks.1 The state legislature enacted this 
1
 Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-37-8(5)(a) - ® provides: 
xx
 (a) Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, a person 
not authorized under this chapter who commits any act declared to 
be unlawful under this section, Title 58, Chapter 37a, Utah Drug 
Paraphernalia Act, or under Title 58, Chapter 3 7b, Imitation 
Controlled Substances Act, is upon conviction subject to the 
penalties and classifications under Subsection (5)(b) if the act 
is committed: 
(I) in a public or private elementary or secondary school 
or on the grounds of any of those schools; 
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statute to enhance criminal penalties for specific conduct. The 
statute was enacted "to protect the public health, safety, and 
welfare of children of Utah from the presumed extreme potential 
danger created when drug transactions occur on or near a school 
ground." State v. Moore, 782 P.2d 497, 503 (Utah 1989). See also 
United States v. Holland, 810 F.2d 1215, 1222 (D.C. Cir.), cert, 
denied, 481 U.S. 1057, 107 S.Ct. 2199, 95 L.Ed.2d 854 (1987) (The 
Utah Supreme Court supports its conclusion of the legislature's 
intent by use of this case.) 
(ii) in a public or private vocational school or post-
secondary institution or on the grounds of any of those schools 
or institutions; 
(iii) in those portions of any building, park, stadium, or 
other structure or grounds which are, at the time of the act, 
being used for an activity sponsored by or through a school or 
institution under Subsections (5) (a) (I) and (ii) ; 
(iv) in or on the grounds of a preschool or child-care 
facility; 
(v) in a public park, amusement park, arcade, or 
recreation center; 
(vi) in a church or synagogue; 
(vii) in a shopping mall, sports facility, stadium, arena, 
theater, movie house, playhouse, or parking lot or structure 
adjacent thereto; 
(viii) in a public parking lot or structure; 
(ix) within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, or 
grounds included in Subsections (5)(a)(I) through (viii); or 
(x) with a person younger than 18 years of age, 
regardless of where the act occurs. 
(b) A person convicted under this subsection is guilty of a first 
degree felony and shall be imprisoned for a term of not less than 
five years if the penalty that would otherwise have been 
established but for this subsection would have been a first 
degree felony. Imposition or execution of the sentence may not be 
suspended, and the person is not eligible for parole until the 
minimum term of imprisonment under this subsection has been 
served. 
® If the classification that would otherwise have been 
established would have been less than a first degree felony but 
for this subsection, a person convicted under this subsection is 
guilty of one degree more than the maximum penalty prescribed for 
that offense. 
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Utah patterned its sentence enhancement provision after the 
federal Controlled Substances Penalties Amendments Act of 1984. 
State v. Strombercr, 783 P.2d 54, 59 (Ut. Ct. App. 1989); see 21 
U.S.C.A. § 860(a) (Supp. 1993); see also State v. Viqh, 871 P.2d 
1030, 1035 (Ut. Ct. App. 1994) .2 Thus, federal case law offers 
direction in answering the question as to whether or not Utah Code 
section 58-37-8 (5) constitutes an "offense" which has an element 
of proof that the act committed took place within a 1,000 feet of 
a public park. In the Tenth Circuit of the United States Court of 
Appeals, the Court recently found that the district court 
"erroneously withdrew any charge based on that statute from the 
jury's consideration in the mistaken belief that section 860 (a) 
did not create a substantive offense and was only a sentencing 
enhancement." United States v. Ashley, 26 F.3d 1008, 1011 (10th 
2
 21 U.S.C. § 860 (a) (Supp. IV 1992) reads as follows: 
Ma) Penalty 
Any person who violates section 841(a) (1) or section 856 of this 
title by distributing, possessing with intent to distribute, or 
manufacturing a controlled substance in or on, or within one 
thousand feet of, the real property comprising a public or 
private elementary, vocational, or secondary school of a public 
or private college, junior college, or university, or a 
playground, or within 100 feet of a public or private youth 
center, public swimming pool, or video arcade facility, is 
(except as provided in subsection (b) of this section subject to 
(1) twice the maximum punishment authorized by section 841(b) of 
this title; and (2) at least twice any term of supervised release 
authorized by section 841(b) of this title for a first offense. A 
fine up to twice that authorized by section 841(b) of this title 
may be imposed in addition to any term of imprisonment authorized 
by this subsection. Except to the extent a greater minimum 
sentence is otherwise provided by section 841(b) of this title, a 
person shall be sentenced under this subsection to a term of 
imprisonment of not less than one year. The mandatory minimum 
sentencing provisions of this paragraph shall not apply to 
offenses involving 5 grams or less of marijuana." 
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Cir. 1994) . The Court in supporting its decision agreed with an 
earlier Tenth Circuit which stated: 
"We agree with those circuits that have concluded that § 
860 constitutes an "offense" which has as an element of 
proof that the distribution occurred within 1,000 feet of 
a protected place. While some circuits construed § 860 
before it was renumbered and amended, these differences 
do not affect our inquiry. Similarly, § 860(a) includes 
as protected places playgrounds and various types of 
schools. Some circuits construed the statute in the 
school context, yet the analysis of § 860(a) as an 
offense would also apply to a playground. See United 
States v. Freyre-Lazaro, 3 F.3d 1496, 1507 (11th Cir. 
1993)(holding that § 841(a) is a lesser included offense 
of § 860); United States v. Scott, 987 F.2d 261, 266 (5th 
Cir. 1993) (same); United States v. Thornton, 901 F.2d 
738, 741 (9th Cir. 1990) (statute "incorporates the 
sentencing enhancement element into the underlying 
offense"); United States v. Holland, 810 F.2d 1215, 1218 
(D.C. Cir.) (statute "adds an element to the offense of 
section 841(a)" which must be "proved") , cert denied, 481 
U.S. 1057, 107 S.Ct. 2199, 95 L.Ed.2d 854 (1987). 
United States v. Smith, 13 F.3d 380, 382 (10th Cir. 1993). 
The courts within the State of Utah have supported this notion 
of an "offense", even though they have not addressed this issue 
directly. In a 1989 case, the Utah Supreme Court stated that 
"Section 58-37-8 (5) merely enhances the penalty when an aggravating 
factor is present." State v. Moore, 782 P.2d 497, 505 (Utah 1989) . 
In discussing the legitimacy that a legislature may enhance 
criminal penalties for specific conduct in its discretion, the Utah 
Court of Appeals concluded that "In this case, the crime for which 
defendant stands convicted is identical to the offense of 
possessing controlled substances, except for the additional element 
that the offense must occur within 1,00 0 feet of a school." State 
v. Stromberg, 783 P.2d 54, 60 (Ut. Ct. App. 1989), cert, denied, 
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795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990). 
Thus, Section 58-37-8(5) constitutes an "offense" which has an 
element of proof that the act committed took place within a 1,000 
feet of a public park and should be proven by the prosecution 
during the course of a jury trial. 
II. 
THE JUDGE EXCEEDED HIS SCOPE WHEN ADMITTING INTO EVIDENCE 
BY JUDICIAL NOTICE THE POLICE MEASUREMENT OF DEFENDANT'S 
RESIDENCE BEING WITHIN 1000 FEET OF A PUBLIC PARK. 
Rule 201(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence states that "a judicially 
noticed fact must be one not subject to reasonable dispute in that 
it is either (1) generally known within the territorial 
jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of accurate and 
ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot 
reasonably be questioned. In determining the meaning of this rule, 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated: " In short, a court is presumed 
to know what every man of ordinary intelligence must know about 
such things." Little Cottonwood Water Co. V. Kimball, 28 9 P. 116 
(Utah 1930); see also Defusion Co. V. Utah Liquor Control Comm'n, 
613 P.2d 1120 (Utah 1980). Thus, a court can take judicial notice 
of things which are commonly known. This should be distinguished 
from judicial knowledge of public records, laws, etc which the 
court is deemed to know by virtue of its office. 
In the present case before this court, the trial court judge 
took judicial notice of the police measurement of defendant's 
residence being within 1,000 feet of a public park. This 
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determination is based on the judge's presumed knowledge that a 
standard block in the county is 800 feet; the park is 1 block from 
the defendant's residence; the judge's personal familiarity with 
the area; and an officer's determination that the defendant's 
residence is located 20 feet from the corner of the block. This 
determination to admit into evidence the police measurement that 
the defendant's residence was within 1,000 feet of a public park 
without the proper offering of proof by the prosecution was beyond 
the judge's authoritative scope. The measurement is not an item 
which "every man or ordinary intelligence must know about such 
things" nor is it judicial knowledge which the court is deemed to 
know by virtue of its office. 
Whether or not a judicially noticed fact of the location of 
streets and distances between them can be taken by a court has been 
determined by the Utah Supreme Court. In an appeal from the order 
dismissing a petition to set aside probate proceedings, the Utah 
Supreme Court declared: "We cannot take judicial notice that these 
street [University Avenue and Center Street] are in Provo or that 
they are actually within 80 yards of each other." In re Phillips' 
Estate, 44 P. 2d 699, 705 (Utah 1935) . Subsequent to In re Phillips' 
Estate, the Court affirmed its earlier position by stating: "we 
cannot take judicial notice of the location of places recited in 
the affidavit and without so doing we cannot find improper 
posting." Jenkins v. Morgan, 196 P.2d 871, 873 (Utah 1948). 
Thus, for the reasons mentioned above, the court exceeded its 
scope when admitting into evidence by judicial notice the police 
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measurement of defendant's residence being within 1,000 feet of a 
public park. 
III. 
ASSUMING JUDICIAL NOTICE OF THE POLICE MEASUREMENT IS 
IMPERMISSIBLE, THE PROSECUTION DID NOT ESTABLISH THE 
PROPER FOUNDATION FOR ADMISSION OF THE FINDING INTO 
EVIDENCE THAT THE DEFENDANT'S RESIDENCE WAS WITHIN 1#000 
FEET OF A PUBLIC PARK. 
During the trial, no testimony or evidence was ever 
established by the prosecution in its offer of proof in determining 
that defendant's residence was within 1,000 feet of a public park. 
In the subsequent enhancement hearing, an officer gave testimony 
that the distance between the park and the residence was measured 
by a pedometer, but the officer was not the one who made the 
measurement nor could he testify to any questions pertaining to the 
accuracy of the pedometer or its calibration. Thus, the prosecution 
needs to establish by direct evidence, hearsay exception, or by 
statutory authority that the measurement was taken, results were 
obtained, the measurement was accurate, the device which was used 
to take the measurement is operable and its reading is reliable. 
From the record of the trial and the sentence enhancement hearing, 
the prosecution failed to establish this important element in its 
case. 
Other instruments used by police officers in the field, such 
as a breathalyzer, must be supported by the proper foundation in 
order to be introduced into evidence in a court of law. For 
example, in the case of a breathalyzer, in order to overcome any 
direct proof or hearsay exceptions, the Utah legislature enacted a 
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statute which relieves "the State of Utah and other governmental 
entities of the financial burden of calling as a witness in every 
DUI case the public officer responsible for testing the accuracy of 
the breathalyzer equipment"Murray City v. Hall, 663 P. 2d 1314, 1320 
(Utah 1983). The Utah Supreme Court went on to conclude: 
"Thus, in place of the officer's testimony, § 41-6-44.3 
permits the admission of affidavits regarding the 
maintenance of a specific breathalyzer as evidence of the 
proper functioning of that breathalyzer machine and the 
accuracy of the ampoules. However, prior to the 
acceptance of those affidavits to establish a presumption 
of the validity of the test results, § 41-6-44.3 requires 
an affirmative finding by the trial court that (1) the 
calibration and testing for accuracy of the breathalyzer 
and the ampoules were performed in accordance with the 
standards established by the Commissioner of Public 
Safety, (2) the affidavits were prepared in the regular 
course of the public officer's duties, (3) that they were 
prepared contemporaneously with the act, condition, or 
event, and (4) the "source of information from which made 
and the method and circumstances of their preparation 
were such as to indicate their trustworthiness." 
Id. , at 1320. In this case, the Utah Supreme Court recognized this 
statute as a valid exception to the hearsay rule, but required a 
proper foundation for the breathalyzer evidence. In addition, Utah 
Admin.R. 735-500-3 (1987) states that a breath testing instrument 
must be checked for proper calibration on "a routine basis, not to 
exceed forty (4 0) days." 
Thus, the prosecution never attempted to establish any direct 
evidence, hearsay exception, or statutory authority to show that 
defendant's residence is within 1,000 feet of a public park. The 
prosecution never established proof of the proper maintenance and 
use of the pedometer or provide testimony of the person taking the 
measurements of its reading or accuracy. The prosecution failed to 
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show that the pedometer is governed by any statutory exception 
similar to the breathalyzer or that it is regulated by an 
administrative rule as to its calibration. Therefore, the 
prosecution did not establish the proper foundation for admission 
into evidence of the finding that the defendant's residence was 
within 1,000 feet of a public park. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the preceding arguments, the lower court's judgment 
should be reversed to the extent that it convicted and sentence the 
Defendant. 
To a First Degree Felony with its minimum mandatory 5 year 
provisions and the matter should be remanded to the District Court 
with instruction to enter a conviction to the Second Degree Felony 
conviction of the jury and a sentence should be entered on the 
Second Degree Felony with credit for time served. 
DATED this J±j_ day of September, 1995. 
BLAINE PERRY MCBRIDE 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
By ^fPy^-^C^SU/ n f?^<^ 
BLAINE PERRY J^CpRID^/ 
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